Cognitive Aging in the Seattle Longitudinal Study: Within-Person Associations of Primary Mental Abilities with Psychomotor Speed and Cognitive Flexibility by Hülür, Gizem et al.
Zurich Open Repository and
Archive
University of Zurich
Main Library
Strickhofstrasse 39
CH-8057 Zurich
www.zora.uzh.ch
Year: 2016
Cognitive Aging in the Seattle Longitudinal Study: Within-Person
Associations of Primary Mental Abilities with Psychomotor Speed and
Cognitive Flexibility
Hülür, Gizem; Ram, Nilam; Willis, Sherry; Schaie, K; Gerstorf, Denis
Abstract: It has long been proposed that cognitive aging in fluid abilities is driven by age-related de-
clines of processing speed. Although study of between-person associations generally supports this view,
accumulating longitudinal between-person and within-person evidence indicates less strong associations
between speed and fluid cognitive performance. Initial evidence also suggests that cognitive flexibility
may explain within-person variability in cognitive performance. In the present study, we used up to
nine waves of data over 56 years from a subsample of 582 participants of the Seattle Longitudinal Study
to examine (a) within-person associations of psychomotor speed and cognitive flexibility with cognitive
aging in primary mental abilities (including inductive reasoning, number ability, verbal meaning, spatial
orientation, and word fluency); and (b) how these within-person associations change with age. In line
with the processing speed theory, results revealed that within persons, primary mental abilities (includ-
ing fluid, crystallized, and visualization measures) were indeed associated with psychomotor speed. We
also observed age-related increases in within-person couplings between primary mental abilities and psy-
chomotor speed. While the processing speed theory focuses primarily on associations with fluid abilities,
age-related increases in coupling were found for a variety of ability domains. Within-person associations
between primary mental abilities and cognitive flexibility were weaker and relatively stable with age. We
discuss the role of speed and flexibility for cognitive aging.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.3390/jintelligence4030012
Posted at the Zurich Open Repository and Archive, University of Zurich
ZORA URL: https://doi.org/10.5167/uzh-135818
Veröffentlichte Version
Originally published at:
Hülür, Gizem; Ram, Nilam; Willis, Sherry; Schaie, K; Gerstorf, Denis (2016). Cognitive Aging in the
Seattle Longitudinal Study: Within-Person Associations of Primary Mental Abilities with Psychomotor
Speed and Cognitive Flexibility. Journal of Intelligence, 4(3):12.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.3390/jintelligence4030012
Intelligence
Journal of
Article
Cognitive Aging in the Seattle Longitudinal Study:
Within-Person Associations of Primary Mental
Abilities with Psychomotor Speed and
Cognitive Flexibility
Gizem Hülür 1,*, Nilam Ram 2, Sherry L. Willis 3, K. Warner Schaie 3 and Denis Gerstorf 4
1 Department of Psychology and University Research Priority Program “Dynamics of Healthy Aging”,
University of Zurich, 8050 Zurich, Switzerland
2 Department of Human Development and Family Studies, Pennsylvania State University, University Park,
003329 PA, USA; nur5@psu.edu
3 Department of Psychiatry and Behavioral Sciences, University of Washington, Seattle, 98195 WA, USA;
oldage@u.washington.edu (S.L.W.); schaie@u.washington.edu (K.W.S.)
4 Department of Psychology, Humboldt University, 10099 Berlin, Germany; denis.gerstorf@hu-berlin.de
* Correspondence: gizem.hueluer@uzh.ch
Academic Editor: Oliver Wilhelm
Received: 21 March 2016; Accepted: 8 September 2016; Published: 14 September 2016
Abstract: It has long been proposed that cognitive aging in fluid abilities is driven by age-related
declines of processing speed. Although study of between-person associations generally supports this
view, accumulating longitudinal between-person and within-person evidence indicates less strong
associations between speed and fluid cognitive performance. Initial evidence also suggests that
cognitive flexibility may explain within-person variability in cognitive performance. In the present
study, we used up to nine waves of data over 56 years from a subsample of 582 participants of
the Seattle Longitudinal Study to examine (a) within-person associations of psychomotor speed
and cognitive flexibility with cognitive aging in primary mental abilities (including inductive
reasoning, number ability, verbal meaning, spatial orientation, and word fluency); and (b) how
these within-person associations change with age. In line with the processing speed theory, results
revealed that within persons, primary mental abilities (including fluid, crystallized, and visualization
measures) were indeed associated with psychomotor speed. We also observed age-related increases
in within-person couplings between primary mental abilities and psychomotor speed. While the
processing speed theory focuses primarily on associations with fluid abilities, age-related increases in
coupling were found for a variety of ability domains. Within-person associations between primary
mental abilities and cognitive flexibility were weaker and relatively stable with age. We discuss the
role of speed and flexibility for cognitive aging.
Keywords: psychomotor speed; cognitive flexibility; primary mental abilities; Seattle Longitudinal
Study; cognitive aging; longitudinal; within-person coupling
1. Introduction
The processing speed hypothesis of cognitive aging [1] states that declines in processing
speed underlie age-related changes in fluid cognitive performance. Evidence in support of
the hypothesis has been primarily obtained using a between-person approach—that is, relying
on sample level (i.e., between persons) associations between speed and cognitive performance.
Generally, these cross-sectional studies find that processing speed mediates cross-sectional age
differences in cognitive performance (for a meta-analysis, see [2]). However, in longitudinal data,
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the between-person and within-person associations between speed and cognitive performance are not
as strong and leave room for alternative explanations [3–17]. It has also been proposed that declines in
attentional flexibility, defined as the ability to switch between task sets, is responsible for age-related
changes in fluid cognitive performance [18]. Cognitive flexibility—attention switching [19] and set
shifting [20,21]—may also explain intraindividual variability in cognitive performance [14]. In the
present study, we use up to nine waves of longitudinal data collected over 56 years from a subsample
of participants of the Seattle Longitudinal Study (SLS; [22]) to examine within-person associations of
psychomotor speed and cognitive flexibility with cognitive aging of primary mental abilities.
1.1. Processing Speed and Cognitive Aging: Between-Person and within-Person Perspectives
According to the processing speed hypothesis [1], age-related decline in fluid cognition is
driven by declines in processing speed. Studies of cross-sectional between-person age differences
in fluid cognitive performance generally find that these differences are mediated by processing
speed. Summarizing this literature, Verhaeghen and Salthouse’s meta-analysis [2] found that 79% of
age-related variance in reasoning (fluid), 72% of age-related variance in space (visualization), and 71%
of age-related variance in episodic memory (memory) was shared with speed. Of course, findings
based on cross-sectional age variance extractions are not always valid representations of the structure
of longitudinal age-related change [23,24]. Longitudinally, changes in processing speed are usually
correlated with changes in fluid cognitive performance, meaning that those individuals who showed
more decline than their peers in processing speed also showed more decline than their peers in fluid
cognitive performance [3,8–10,15–17]. However, the strength of the association was typically lower
than seen in the cross-sectional studies.
In addition to examining between-person associations of longitudinal changes between processing
speed and other indicators of fluid cognitive performance, some studies examined between-person
lead–lag associations [4–7]. According to the processing speed hypothesis, change in processing
speed is responsible for cognitive decline. Therefore, changes in processing speed should precede
changes in other cognitive abilities. That is, those who perform worse than others in processing speed
at a given measurement wave would show more decline over the next period in another cognitive
test. These studies generally found that earlier levels of processing speed predicted subsequent
change in cognitive performance, with some studies finding the lead–lag association only with fluid
cognitive performance [4,7], and others finding lead–lag associations also with crystallized cognitive
performance [5,6].
Taken all together, previous research based on analysis of between-person associations indicates
that speed is associated with cognitive ability, and that this association is typically stronger when
looking at links at performance at a single occasion (cross-sectional) than when looking at longitudinal
changes. Furthermore, findings regarding lead–lag associations suggest a temporal link between
processing speed and (subsequent) changes in cognitive performance, with some indication that those
influences pervade both fluid and crystallized abilities.
Notably, the mechanisms driving associations between processing speed and cognitive
performance are assumed to operate within-person (see [1]). As processing speed declines, individuals
are assumed to perform less effectively on cognitive tasks because (a) cognitive processes cannot be
executed within given time limits; and (b) because information from earlier processing steps are not
available for higher-order processes that require simultaneous integration of information. Salthouse [1]
draws from (a) “assembly line” and (b) “juggling” metaphors to illustrate these mechanisms: (a) a task
needs to be completed before available time runs out; and (b) a task will not be executed successfully if
constituent tasks are not completed on time. As individuals age, these processing constraints exert
more and more pressure on cognitive performance. From a within-person perspective, the hypothesis
is that when a person scores lower than usual on a test of processing speed, he or she will also perform
lower than usual on other tests of cognitive performance. At the extreme end of the within-person
perspective, relative rank compared to other persons is irrelevant.
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Some studies have indeed examined associations between processing speed and cognitive
performance from a within-person perspective. Using processing speed as a time-varying predictor,
these studies generally found within-person associations between processing speed and cognitive
performance [11–13]. However, processing speed did not account for all of the longitudinal age-related
changes in cognitive performance. Systematic long-term change was still evident after controlling for
the within-person changes in speed in the multi-year cognitive performance trajectories. Taken together,
studies focusing on within-person associations generally suggest that there may be links between
processing speed and fluid cognitive performance.
A different view of the within-person associations emerges in studies examining within-person
associations in daily data [14]. Cognitive variability over different time scales (e.g., trial-to-trial,
block-to-block, day-to-day, year-to-year) may be based on different processes and show distinct
associations with other variables [25,26]. At the faster time scale in daily data, day-to-day changes
in fluid cognitive performance measured in a test of working memory were not associated with
day-to-day changes in processing speed within persons [14]. Instead, day-to-day changes in working
memory were linked with cognitive flexibility (measured as performance on an attention switching
task), as we will explain in more detail below.
In addition to suggesting that processing speed and cognitive ability are linked within-person,
the processing speed hypothesis [1] indicates that this link should get stronger with age.
The meta-analysis by Verhaeghen and Salthouse [2] found that associations between speed and
performance on a variety of cognitive tests were stronger at older ages. In particular, the association was
stronger among adults older than 50 years than among adults younger than 50 years, the implication
being that cognitive slowing constrained older adults’ performance on a wide range of fluid cognitive
tasks. Relatively less is known regarding whether within-person associations become stronger with age.
1.2. Cognitive Flexibility and Cognitive Aging: Between-Person and within-Person Perspectives
Cognitive flexibility, defined as attention switching and task shifting, declines in old age [27,28].
It has been argued that individual differences in cognitive flexibility could be responsible for age-related
changes in other cognitive abilities. For example, Stankov (1988) [18] found that cross-sectional
age differences in fluid cognitive performance were no longer reliably different from zero after
controlling for attentional flexibility, a latent factor reflecting individual differences in the ability
to change mental sets. Compared to processing speed, cognitive flexibility received relatively less
attention as an explanatory variable in cognitive aging. However, as noted in the previous section,
Stawski and colleagues (2013) [14] found that day-to-day changes in working memory were linked
with cognitive flexibility. Although differences in processing speed were linked to between-person
differences in working memory, they were not linked to day-to-day changes. Based on this finding,
the authors concluded that different mechanisms may be relevant for between-person vs within-person
variability in working memory. They argued that between-person differences in processing speed
may indicate individual differences in brain integrity and thus explain between-person differences in
working memory performance, while attention switching may be a mechanism involved in day-to-day
performance variability in working memory tasks. These findings are in line with the view of
Verhaeghen and Basak (2005) [29], who proposed that switching the focus of attention is a cognitive
primitive of working memory performance. It remains an open question as to whether cognitive
flexibility may have within-person associations when looking at change at the slower time scale, across
multiple years.
If cognitive flexibility is relevant for age-related differences in other cognitive abilities, it may
be expected that within-person associations increase with age. At the between-person level,
Schaie (1958) [27] reported that the correlations between cognitive flexibility and primary mental
abilities were relatively stable across the adult lifespan. Stawski and colleagues [14] found no age
differences in the strength of the within-person couplings between working memory, speed, and
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attention switching between younger (18–24 years old) and older (66–95 years old) adults. It is an open
question whether the within-person coupling becomes stronger as individuals become older.
1.3. The Present Study
Our goal in the present study was to examine (a) whether within-person fluctuations in cognitive
performance can be predicted by within-person fluctuations in speed and/or cognitive flexibility;
and (b) whether the strength of these associations increases with age. According to the processing
speed hypothesis, speed should be associated with fluid cognitive performance within persons
and this association should become stronger as individuals get older. Furthermore, if cognitive
flexibility is involved in cognitive performance, we should see within-person associations between
cognitive flexibility and cognitive performance. In the present study, we used up to nine waves of
data obtained over 56 years in the Seattle Longitudinal Study (SLS; [22]) to examine within-person
associations of cognitive performance (five primary mental abilities; [30]) with psychomotor speed
and cognitive flexibility.
2. Materials and Methods
The SLS is an interdisciplinary longitudinal panel study that followed participants across the
entire adult life span. The study design is described in detail elsewhere [22], with details relevant to
the present study included below (see also [31,32]).
2.1. Participants and Procedure
Since 1956, close to 6000 individuals between 22 and 101 years of age participated in the SLS.
Participants were community-dwelling individuals in the Seattle metropolitan area and were recruited
and stratified by sex and age (22–70 years old at baseline) from members of a health maintenance
organization. Following a cohort-sequential design, new participants joined the study at 7 year
intervals. The subsample in the present study includes participants who joined the SLS in 1956, 1963,
1970, 1977, or 1984 and provided at least five observations of psychomotor speed, cognitive flexibility,
and primary mental abilities. In sum, we utilized longitudinal data obtained from N = 582 individuals
on up to nine measurement occasions at 7 year intervals of up to 56 years (1956, 1963, 1970, 1977, 1984,
1991, 1998, 2005, and 2012). Table 1 provides an overview of sociodemographic characteristics for the
full study sample and separately according to the year the participants joined the SLS.
Table 1. Descriptive statistics for sociodemographic variables.
Sample n
Age at Baseline
% Women
Years of Education
M SD Range M SD Range
Whole sample 582 40.96 10.07 21–66 59 15.00 2.63 8–20
Baseline in 1956 93 40.12 9.42 22–61 57 14.89 2.72 8–20
Baseline in 1963 153 40.34 9.13 21–64 65 14.33 2.48 8–20
Baseline in 1970 126 41.01 10.15 22–65 58 14.45 2.57 8–20
Baseline in 1977 107 42.11 11.46 23–66 52 15.72 2.45 8–20
Baseline in 1984 103 41.36 10.42 24–63 61 16.01 2.55 12–20
2.2. Measures
2.2.1. Primary Mental Abilities
Five subtests from Thurstone’s Primary Mental Abilities Test (1948 PMA 11–17 version; [30]) were
given to participants at every wave since the beginning of the study. Using the scores of the entire SLS
sample at their first measurement occasion as reference (see [22]), we standardized the raw scores on
each test to a T-score metric (M = 50, SD = 10).
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In the Number Ability test, participants are presented with an arithmetic problem and are asked
whether a given solution is correct. The score indicates the frequency of correct responses minus the
frequency of wrong responses. In the Verbal Meaning test, participants are asked to indicate the correct
synonym for words out of four given alternatives. This test measures an individual’s recognition
vocabulary. In the Word Fluency test, participants are asked to list as many words as possible that begin
with the letter “S” (common nouns but not proper nouns) within 5 min. The score indicates the number
of valid words named by the participant and indicates the ability to retrieve words from long-term
storage. In the Inductive Reasoning test, participants are presented with series of alphabetic letters
and are asked to indicate the letter that logically follows in the series from six alternatives. The score
indicates an individual’s ability to plan and to solve logical problems. In the Spatial Orientation test,
participants are presented with a stimulus figure and asked to indicate out of six alternatives which
figure is a rotation and not a mirror image of the stimulus figure.
Theoretical embedding: In the extended theory and model of fluid and crystallized
intelligence [33,34], inductive reasoning is a measure of fluid ability, number ability is a measure
of quantitative mathematical abilities, verbal meaning is a measure of crystallized ability, spatial
orientation represents visualization, and fluency represents retrieval ability. According to the
three-stratum theory [35], inductive reasoning represents the second-stratum factor fluid ability,
number ability and verbal meaning represent crystallized ability, spatial orientation represents broad
visual perception, and word fluency represents broad retrieval ability. In the Cattell–Horn–Carroll
(CHC) model [36,37], inductive reasoning represents fluid ability, number ability represents
quantitative knowledge, verbal meaning represents crystallized ability, spatial orientation represents
visual processing, and word fluency represents long-term storage and retrieval. From a
neuropsychological and executive functioning perspective, inductive reasoning is closely related to
updating and working memory, and fluency is considered a measure of executive functioning [20,21].
2.2.2. Psychomotor Speed and Cognitive Flexibility
Psychomotor speed and cognitive flexibility were indicated by performance on two tests of
behavioral rigidity [22] that were assessed at every wave since the beginning of the study.
Components for psychomotor speed and cognitive flexibility scores: The capitals test consists of
two parts. In the first part of the test, participants are asked to copy a paragraph that contains words
starting in capital letters, words spelled entirely in capital letters, or words where the first letter is
spelled in lower case letters and the rest is spelled in capital letters. In the second part of the test,
participants are asked to recopy the paragraph but substitute lower case letters for capital letters and
vice versa. Participants are given 2.5 min for each part of the test [22]. The capital test gives two
scores: copying speed, indicating the number of correctly copied words in the first part of the task,
and instructional set flexibility, the proportion of number of correctly copied words in the second part
of the task to the number of correctly copied words in the first part of the task [22].
In the opposites test, participants are presented three lists with 40 stimulus words each. First,
participants are asked to give, in two minutes, synonyms for as many words as possible in the first
list. Then, participants are asked to give, in the next two minutes, antonyms for as many words as
possible in the second list. Finally, they are asked to give, again in two minutes, antonyms or synonyms
depending on whether words were written in small case or capital letters. The test yields three scores:
associational speed indicating number of correct responses in the first two lists, and two associational
flexibility scores, indicating (a) the proportion of erroneous responses in the third list to the total
number of responses in the third list; and (b) the proportion of number of correct responses in the third
list to the number of correct responses in the first and second lists, respectively. Formulae to calculate
the associational flexibility scores can be found elsewhere [22].
Computation of psychomotor speed and cognitive flexibility scores: A psychomotor speed factor
score indicating the “functional efficiency in coping with familiar situations requiring rapid response
and quick thinking” [19] (p. 608) was calculated for each person on each occasion as a weighted
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composite of the copying speed (weight = 0.60) and associational speed (weight = 0.40) scores. Similarly,
a cognitive flexibility factor score indicating “the individual’s ability to shift without difficulty from
one activity to another; it is a measure of effective adjustment to shifts in familiar patterns and
to continuously changing situational demands” [19] (pp. 608–609) was calculated as a weighted
composite of the instructional flexibility (weight = 0.25) and the first (weight = 0.35) and the second
(weight = 0.40) associational flexibility scores [22]. For convenience of interpretation, factor scores
were standardized to a T-score metric (M = 50, SD = 10) based on the first occasion scores of the entire
SLS sample (see [22]). Higher scores indicate speediness and flexibility.
Theoretical embedding: In the extended theory and model of fluid and crystallized
intelligence [33,34], the indicator of psychomotor speed represents processing speed, because it is
based on tasks that require participants to “quickly find or state correct answers to easy problems”
and to “quickly copy printed mixed upper- and lowercase letters and words” [34] (p. 77). According
to the three-stratum theory [35], copying speed represents the second-stratum broad speediness factor
(narrow ability: “writing speed”, also a psychomotor ability: see Chapter 13) and associational speed
can be considered to measure the narrow ability “rate of work in performing verbal tasks” [35] (see
Chapter 11) which is related to the second-stratum broad speediness factor [35] (speed of response,
see p. 634). In the CHC speed hierarchy [37,38], copying speed reflects the narrow ability “writing
speed” and the second-stratum ability of “broad psychomotor speed” and associational speed is
most closely related to the second-stratum ability of “broad cognitive speed” (“rate of test taking”).
Psychomotor speed in the SLS is highly correlated with, but not identical to, perceptual speed [28].
Also, our measure of psychomotor speed probably reflects a different construct than “broad decision
speed” [37,38], which is typically measured with simple and choice reaction time tasks. Cognitive
flexibility arguably represents the broad ability of short-term memory within the CHC model of
intelligence [34] (narrow ability: shifting), while it is less clear how cognitive flexibility would be
classified within the extended Gf–Gc and CHC frameworks.
2.2.3. Age
Chronological age at each measurement occasion indicated the number of years since an
individual’s birth. This variable was coded in integer numbers and centered at 70 years, and,
to facilitate interpretation of model parameters, scaled in decades. The frequencies of observations
across chronological age are presented in Figure 1. As can be seen, the bulk of observations fall between
age 33 (5th percentile) and 84 (95th percentile) with the results applying most pertinently in this range.
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2.3. Data Analysis
Within-person couplings of each of the five primary mental abilities with (a) psychomotor speed
and (b) cognitive flexibility were examined using multilevel models of detrended longitudinal data.
Detailed description of the analytical methods can be found in elsewhere [32], with example setup
given here (for within-person coupling of number ability and psychomotor speed). Second, we
modeled within-person couplings and age-related changes therein.
2.3.1. Detrending
First, following standard time series analytical procedures, we detrended each individual’s
data [39–42], thereby removing long-term developmental trends over time-in-study (56 years) that
might confound our examination of within-person coupling. Specifically, we estimated individual-level
growth models wherein the outcomes were regressed on time-in-study using SAS Proc GLM [43].
For example, linear and quadratic trends in psychomotor speed and number ability were obtained and
removed using the regression model,
number abilityt = β0 + β1(timet) + β2(time2t) + ent (1)
psychomotor speedt = β0 + β1(timet) + β2(time2t) + ept (2)
where number abilityt and psychomotor speedt, scores at occasion t, are a function of intercept and linear
and quadratic change parameters (β0, β1, and β2, respectively), and residual terms, ent for number
ability and ept for psychomotor speed, respectively. The residual scores ept and ent then are the
detrended scores used in examination of within-person couplings.
2.3.2. Within-Person Couplings
Within-person couplings of each of the primary mental abilities with psychomotor speed and
cognitive flexibility, and how these couplings change with age, were then examined in a multilevel
modeling framework [44] using SAS Proc Mixed [45]. For example, detrended scores for number
ability were modeled as
enti = [γ10(epti) + u1i(epti)] + [γ20(epti × ageti) + γ30(epti × age2ti)] + rti (3)
where enti and epti are detrended scores of person i for number ability and psychomotor speed at time
t, γ10 is the prototypical within-person coupling parameter that indicates the strength of the coupling
between number ability and psychomotor speed at age 70 (centering age), u1i are person-specific
deviations from the prototypical within-person coupling parameter γ10. For example, if person i
would show a stronger within-person coupling between number ability and psychomotor speed
than the sample average (as indicated by γ10), then u1i would be positive. If person i would show a
weaker within-person coupling than the typical participant, then u1i would be negative. γ20 and γ30
indicate the prototypical linear and quadratic age-related rates of change in the within-person coupling.
Note that because the number of observations per participant was relatively low, we did not model
between-person differences in age-related linear and quadratic rates of change (i.e., u2i and u3i), a point
we shall return to in the discussion. For illustration, Figure 2 shows how within-person coupling of
psychomotor speed and number ability may differ across persons and/or age: Panel A shows the
detrended time series of psychomotor speed and number ability for a participant with relatively low
within-person coupling (γ10 + u1i = 0.006) and Panel B shows the time series for a participant with
relatively high within-person coupling (γ10 + u1i = 1.049). Pseudo-R2 was calculated as the percentage
reduction in residual variance after accounting for within-person couplings with psychomotor speed
and cognitive flexibility, respectively, and linear and quadratic age-related changes therein.
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coupling from psychomotor speed to number ability (γ10 + u1i = 0.006); (b) high level of coupling from
psychomotor speed to number ability (γ10 + u1i = 1.049).
3. Results
3.1. Within-Person Coupling between Primary Mental Abilities and Psychomotor Speed
Result from the models exami ing ithin-person couplings between t e five primary mental
abilities and psychomotor speed and how these couplings change with age re sh wn in Table 2.
The average within-person coupling parameter γ10 indicates the extent to which fluctuations of a
primary mental ability can be predicted by psychomotor speed. For example, the γ10 = 0.177 indicates
the extent of coupling between number ability and psychomotor speed for the typical participant
at age 70 years (centering age). That is, when a participant scored 1 unit higher in psychomotor
speed than was expected, based on his or her longitudinal trajectory, his or her score on the test of
number ability was also 0.177 units higher than expected. The γ10 parameters in all five models were
reliably different from 0 (range 0.090 to 0. 01, < .05), indicating that, o average, psychomotor
speed was coupled with all the primary cognitive abili ies at the w thin-person level (at age 70 years),
with the ext nt of coupling differing across per ons (σ2u1 ≥ 0.210, p < 0.05). Within-person couplings
with psychomotor speed and linear and quadratic age-related changes therein explained 16%–21% of
within-person variance in detrended primary mental abilities.
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Table 2. Multilevel model examining age-related change in the within-person coupling of primary mental abilities and psychomotor speed.
Primary Mental
Ability
Coupling Parameter
γ10 (SE)
Linear Age Change in the
Coupling Parameter γ20 (SE)
Quadratic Age Change in the
Coupling Parameter γ30 (SE)
Variance of the Coupling
Parameter σ2u1 (SE)
Residual Variance
σ2e (SE)
Pseudo R2
Number Ability 0.177 * (0.034) 0.047 * (0.023) 0.010 (0.008) 0.229 * (0.030) 6.297 * (0.166) 18%
Verbal Meaning 0.201 * (0.036) 0.067 * (0.023) 0.013 (0.008) 0.274 * (0.037) 6.156 * (0.167) 20%
Word Fluency 0.108 * (0.040) −0.010 (0.026) 0.005 (0.009) 0.340 * (0.043) 8.136 * (0.216) 20%
Inductive Reasoning 0.106 * (0.031) 0.044 * (0.020) 0.013 (0.007) 0.210 * (0.025) 4.527 * (0.120) 21%
Spatial Orientation 0.090 * (0.038) 0.087 * (0.026) 0.031 * (0.009) 0.265 * (0.037) 8.115 * (0.215) 16%
Note: N = 582. Scores for psychomotor speed and primary mental abilities were scaled in a T metric (M = 50, SD = 10) based on first occasion data of the entire Seattle Longitudinal
Study (SLS) sample. Unstandardized estimates, standard errors in parentheses. Chronological age was centered at 70 years and scaled in decades to facilitate interpretation.
Each primary mental ability was predicted by psychomotor speed at the within-person level, with γ10 indicating the prototypical within-person coupling; γ20 and γ30 indicate rate of
age-related linear and quadratic change in the coupling parameter per decade; σ2u1 is the variance of the within-person coupling parameter γ10, and σ2e is the residual variance.
Pseudo-R2 was calculated as the percentage reduction in residual variance after controlling for within-person couplings with psychomotor speed and linear and quadratic age changes
therein. * p < 0.05.
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There was also evidence of systematic age-related change in the within-person coupling.
Specifically, the γ20 parameters indicate rate of age-related linear change in the within-person
coupling parameters. For example, the linear age parameter describing change in the within-person
coupling of number ability and psychomotor speed is γ20 = 0.047 units per decade, indicating that the
age 70 coupling parameter of γ10 = 0.177 increased to 0.177 + 0.047 = 0.224 at age 80 (quadratic trends
not taken into account). Thus, for the average participant at 80 years of age, when psychomotor speed
score was 1 unit higher than expected based on his or her longitudinal trajectory, his or her number
ability was 0.224 units higher than expected. Table 2 shows evidence of systematic age-related linear
increases in the within-person coupling for number ability (γ20 = 0.047), verbal ability (γ20 = 0.067),
inductive reasoning (γ20 = 0.044), and spatial orientation (γ20 = 0.087), but not for word fluency
(γ20 = −0.010). Significant quadratic curvature in the age-related changes was only evident for spatial
orientation (γ30 = 0.031), indicating that the within-person coupling was slightly stronger at both
ends of the adult lifespan, and slightly weaker in the middle. We note that this pattern may be based
on fewer observations being available at both ends of the lifespan (see Figure 1). This may result in
stronger curvature observed at these points when fitting a polynomial model with a quadratic term.
Visual depictions of the age-related changes in within-person coupling are shown in Figure 3. In sum,
(a) all primary abilities showed within-person associations with psychomotor speed; (b) the strength
of the coupling increased linearly with age for all primary mental abilities with the exception of word
fluency; and (c) with some curvature for spatial orientation.
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Figure 3. ithin-person coupling parameters (γ10) across chronological age for psychomotor speed and
primary mental abilities. All primary mental abilities were associated with psychomotor speed within
persons at age 70 years and within-person associations with psychomotor speed linearly increased
with age for all primary mental abilities with the exception of word fluency. Furthermore, quadratic
age trends were observed for spatial orientation.
3.2. Within-Person Coupling between Primary Mental Abilities and Cognitive Flexibility
Results from the models examining within-person couplings between the five primary mental
abilities and cognitive flexibility and how these couplings change across chronological age are shown
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in Table 3. The interpretation of the parameters is the same as above. For the prototypical individual at
age 70 (centering age), there was evidence that number ability (γ10 = 0.060) and inductive reasoning
(γ10 = 0.057) were systematically linked to cognitive flexibility, but the other primary mental abilities
were not. As before, there were between-person differences in the strength of the within-person
couplings (σ2u1 ≥ 0.095, p < 0.05) and evidence of a systematic linear age-related increase in the
within-person couplings between number ability and cognitive flexibility (γ20 = 0.034). Although
the age-related changes were not significant for the other primary mental abilities, there was hint of
quadratic age-related change for verbal meaning (γ30 = 0.012) and spatial orientation (γ30 = −0.017).
For verbal meaning, the quadratic effect was positive, indicating that the within-person coupling was
slightly stronger at both ends of the adult lifespan and slightly weaker in the middle. For spatial
orientation, the quadratic effect was negative, indicating that the within-person coupling was slightly
weaker at the ends of the adult lifespan and stronger in the middle. Again, the stronger curvature
at both ends of the age span may be based on the scarcity of observations at the extremes of the
distributions. Within-person couplings with cognitive flexibility and linear and quadratic age-related
changes therein explained 14%–19% of within-person variance in detrended primary mental abilities.
Visual depictions of the age-related changes in within-person coupling are shown in Figure 4. In sum,
there was little evidence for within-person couplings between primary mental abilities and cognitive
flexibility and linear-age related changes therein; with relatively small within-person coupling for
number ability and inductive reasoning and small linear (for number ability) or quadratic change (for
verbal meaning and spatial orientation) across the adult lifespan.
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Figure 4. Within-person coupling parameters (γ10) across chronological age for cognitive flexibility
and primary mental abilities. Cognitive flexibility was associated with number ability and inductive
reasoning within persons at age 70 years. Linear increase in within-person coupling with cognitive
flexibility was observed for number ability, quadratic age trends were observed for verbal meaning
and spatial orientation.
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Table 3. Multilevel model examining age-related change in the within-person coupling of primary mental abilities and cognitive flexibility.
Primary Mental
Ability
Coupling Parameter
γ10 (SE)
Linear Age Change in the
Coupling Parameter γ20 (SE)
Quadratic Age Change in the
Coupling Parameter γ30 (SE)
Variance of the Coupling
Parameter σ2u1 (SE)
Residual Variance
σ2e (SE)
Pseudo R2
Number Ability 0.060 * (0.023) 0.034 * (0.016) 0.009 (0.006) 0.095 * (0.014) 6.543 * (0.172) 15%
Verbal Meaning 0.038 (0.026) 0.026 (0.016) 0.012 * (0.006) 0.168 * (0.023) 6.239 * (0.172) 19%
Word Fluency 0.013 (0.028) 0.021 (0.019) 0.001 (0.007) 0.149 * (0.023) 8.649 * (0.233) 14%
Inductive Reasoning 0.057 * (0.021) 0.021 (0.014) 0.009 (0.005) 0.089 * (0.012) 4.759 * (0.126) 17%
Spatial Orientation 0.027 (0.029) −0.035 (0.018) −0.017 * (0.006) 0.196 * (0.025) 7.775 * (0.210) 19%
Note: N = 582. Scores for cognitive flexibility and primary mental abilities were scaled in a T metric (M = 50, SD = 10) based on first occasion data of the entire SLS sample.
Unstandardized estimates, standard errors in parentheses. Chronological age was centered at 70 years and scaled in decades to facilitate interpretation. Each primary mental ability
was predicted by cognitive flexibility at the within-person level, with γ10 indicating the prototypical within-person coupling; γ20 and γ30 indicating rate of age-related linear and
quadratic change in the coupling parameter per decade; σ2u1 is the variance of the within-person coupling parameter γ10; and σ2e is the residual variance. Pseudo-R2 was calculated as
the percentage reduction in residual variance after controlling for within-person couplings with cognitive flexibility and linear and quadratic age changes therein. * p < 0.05.
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4. Discussion
This study examined within-person associations of five primary mental abilities with psychomotor
speed and cognitive flexibility. Our findings indicate that psychomotor speed was linked to primary
mental abilities within-persons. That is, when a person performed better than usual on a test of
psychomotor speed as expected based on his or her developmental trajectory, he or she also performed
better than usual on all five tests of primary mental abilities. In line with predictions of the processing
speed hypothesis [1], there was also some evidence for age-related increases in the strength of the
within-person coupling with psychomotor speed. Age-related increases in the within-person coupling
with psychomotor speed were observed for number ability, verbal ability, inductive reasoning, and
spatial orientation. In contrast, there was relatively little evidence of systematic within-person
associations between links between cognitive flexibility and the primary mental abilities (exception of
number and reasoning ability) or systematic age-related change in the couplings. Below, we discuss
possible factors underlying these findings.
4.1. Within-Person Associations of Psychomotor Speed and Cognitive Flexibility with Primary Mental Abilities
According to the processing speed theory of cognitive aging [1], processing speed becomes an
increasingly critical factor for cognitive performance with age. Our study provided some evidence for
this hypothesis by showing that all primary mental abilities were indeed linked with psychomotor
speed, within-persons, when people were 70 years old. The strength of this within-person association
generally increased with age for four of five primary mental abilities, including number ability and
verbal meaning—aspects of crystallized cognitive ability, and spatial orientation—a visualization
ability [46,47]. However, the processing speed theory is primarily focused on the link between
age-related declines in speed and age-related declines in fluid cognitive performance. Thus, our
findings on age-related increases in within-person couplings with speed for primarily crystallized
measures stretch a bit beyond the theory-based hypotheses. It is important to note that the two
crystallized measures used here, number ability and verbal meaning tests (particularly as assessed
by Thurstone’s PMA measures), are highly speeded tests when compared to other measures of these
abilities [22,48]. Thus, the couplings may, in part, reflect a “performance-specific confound” rather
than a “construct-relevant” association [48,49]. For example, Wilhelm and Schulze (2002) [50] reported
that mental speed showed stronger associations with a reasoning test when it was administered under
a time limit (r = 0.49) than when it was administered without a time limit (r = 0.34). Taken together,
our findings on within-person associations between primary mental abilities and psychomotor speed
generally supported the processing speed theory, while some findings went beyond predictions based
on this theory.
The dedifferentiation hypothesis of cognitive aging proposes that the structure of cognitive
abilities becomes compressed (less differentiated) in advanced ages [51]. This would manifest
as stronger associations between cognitive abilities in older as compared to younger individuals
(between-persons) or as associations becoming stronger as individuals get older (within-persons).
A recent study using data from the SLS supported the dedifferentiation hypothesis by demonstrating
an age-related increase in within-person couplings among primary mental abilities [32]. Deteriorations
in biological resources [52,53] and deteriorations in more basal cognitive processes, such as speed [49],
have been proposed as mechanisms underlying cognitive dedifferentiation. The findings of the present
study show that some primary mental abilities become more strongly coupled with psychomotor
speed as people get older and suggest that speed may be a candidate variable to explain cognitive
dedifferentiation at the within-person level.
In the present study, cognitive flexibility did not predict primary mental abilities at the
within-person level, with the exception of number ability and inductive reasoning. Cognitive flexibility
as measured in the SLS represents set shifting or attention switching. This pattern of findings is different
from the findings of Stawski and colleagues [14] who reported that processing speed did not predict
cognitive performance within-persons, but attention switching did. Differences in methodological
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approaches of these two studies could potentially explain the discrepancy between findings. First,
Stawski and colleagues [14] examined day-to-day fluctuations of cognitive performance, whereas
we examined fluctuations around the individual developmental trajectory that spanned over many
years. As noted in the introduction, intraindividual variability over different time scales may be
caused by different processes [25,26]. Thus, cognitive variability over different time scales may show
different associations with other variables. Day-to-day variability in cognitive performance may be
(partially) caused by, for example, lapses of attention or ability to focus, which are related to executive
functions like cognitive flexibility. On the other hand, variability over longer time frames, such as
seven years in the present study, may be caused by processing speed, which arguably reflects global
health and brain function [14]. Therefore, it is possible that cognitive flexibility is more relevant
for explaining day-to-day variability, whereas psychomotor speed is more relevant for long-term
variability. Second, Stawski and colleagues [14] examined within-person associations between speed
and working memory, whereas we examined within-person associations with a variety of primary
mental abilities. For example, inductive reasoning, assessed in this study, is closely related to the
construct of working memory, and was one of the two primary mental abilities for which we found a
coupling with cognitive flexibility. Inductive reasoning/working memory and cognitive flexibility
have both been identified as components of executive functions. Also, it has been proposed that
processes related to cognitive flexibility, task switching, and attention switching are strongly involved
in working memory (e.g., [54]). Thus, working memory may be more closely related to cognitive
flexibility than primary mental abilities. Taken together, cognitive flexibility did not emerge as a
powerful predictor of within-person fluctuations of primary mental abilities in our study.
4.2. Limitations and Outlook
To put the findings in perspective, we note several limitations of our study. First, because our
study involved relatively few observations per person, we were not able to examine between-person
differences in how within-person associations between primary mental abilities, psychomotor speed,
and cognitive flexibility change with age. Further work is needed to parse out how the age trends
in within-person associations differ across persons. For example, we used cohort-sequential data
where participants were measured over the same age ranges in different time periods (see Table 1)
and thus belonged to different birth-year cohorts. Cohort differences in longitudinal trajectories of
cognitive performance are well-documented in the SLS [31,55]. Our detrending procedure accounted
for any individual differences in levels of performance and in rates of linear and quadratic change,
including those associated with birth-year cohort. However, cohort differences may also exist in how
the coupling with psychomotor speed and cognitive flexibility changes with age. Second, the measures
have some limitations. Specifically, our measure of speed involved a motor component, and this
was an indicator of psychomotor speed ability rather than a pure measure of processing speed. Also,
as noted above, the supposedly crystallized measures of number ability and verbal meaning tests in
the present study are highly speeded measures [22,48]. Associations with psychomotor speed may be
weaker with more cognitively demanding tasks measuring verbal and numerical ability. For example,
in the number ability task, participants had to judge whether additions of 60 simple sums were correct
and had 6 min to do so (3.6 s per item). One may expect that participants would have been able to
solve a much higher proportion of the items if there was no time limitation. Therefore, under time
constraints, individual as well as intraindividual differences in performance may have depended
on whether one can solve the task quickly or not. In contrast, participants may not be able to solve
a complex numerical task even if they have unlimited time. Thus, variation in performance in a
cognitively more demanding task may depend more strongly on crystallized numerical knowledge
than on speed. Furthermore, the cognitive flexibility score was based on ratio scores, which can
at best be as reliable as the constituent scores. Thus, the lack of within-person associations with
cognitive flexibility may also be based on the lower reliability of the cognitive flexibility scores. Also,
the psychomotor speed measure was not a pure indicator of speed, but also involved other components
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(for example, verbal skills in the analogies task). In addition, indicators of psychomotor speed and
cognitive flexibility were calculated based on the performance on the same tasks, therefore they are
not independent measures. This precluded examining the within-person effects of psychomotor speed
and cognitive flexibility simultaneously. Third, the data are limited in that they only provide for
analysis of fluctuations in performance that manifest across 7 year intervals. As discussed above,
different processes and associations may manifest at different time scales. An interesting side effect of
working at this time scale is that we have necessarily assumed within-person homogeneity in variance
of cognitive performance across approximately 50 years. There is some possibility that differences in
variance may be related to differences in coupling (through restriction-of-range effects). Data collected
at shorter intervals, and using measurement burst designs, will provide for separation and examination
of both age-related changes in intraindividual variability and intraindividual coupling.
5. Conclusions
The current study adds to previous work on associations between speed, cognitive flexibility, and
cognitive performance by explicitly examining within-person associations and age-related changes in
those associations. Our findings show that psychomotor speed predicted all primary mental abilities
within persons, whereas associations with cognitive flexibility were weaker. Furthermore, four out of
five within-person couplings between primary mental abilities and psychomotor speed increased with
age, whereas within-person associations between primary mental abilities and cognitive flexibility
were relatively stable with age. Next steps include identifying the specific biological and psychological
mechanism that may drive the within-person associations between speed and cognitive performance.
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